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Cryptographic Techniques Overview

1. Name of Cryptographic Technique ESIGN	
Categories	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">1.Asymmetric Cryptographic Schemes</div> 2.Symmetric Ciphers 3.Hush Functions 4.Pseudo-random Number Generators
Security Functions of Asymmetric Cryptographic Schemes	
1.confidentiality 2. Authentication <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">3. signature</div> 4. key- sharing	
Subcategories of Symmetric Ciphers	
1. stream ciphers 2. 64-bits block ciphers 3. 128-bits block ciphers	
2. Cryptographic Techniques Overview	
2.1 Design policy	
(1) Criteria of Security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) We adopt the strongest security notion of security for a digital signature scheme-- existentially unforgeable against adaptively-chosen message attacks. (b) Security in the above sense must be proven in a cryptosystem, that is to say, a digital signature scheme that is called a provably secure one, can, theoretically, be proven secure under some reasonable assumptions. 	
(2) Performance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) At least as efficient as the well-known previously-proposed schemes such as EC-based schemes and RSA-based schemes. 	
<p>To achieve provable security (in the strongest sense), we adopt the random oracle paradigm along with a reasonable intractable assumption. In the random oracle paradigm, security of a cryptosystem is proved assuming hash functions are modeled as random oracles. This paradigm was originally proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in [Bellare and Rogaway, 1993], and is rapidly becoming a standard approach to achieve a provably-secure cryptosystem. Security of ESIGN, in the random oracle model, can be assured under an intractable assumption, which we name the approximate S-th root assumption, an approximate version of RSA assumption.</p> <p>As for efficiency, signature generation with ESIGN is ten times more efficient than that achieved with RSA-based signature schemes, while their verification performances are comparable. Compared to EC(Elliptic Curve)-based signature schemes, ESIGN is several times faster in terms of signature and verification performance.</p>	
2.2 Intended applications	
ESIGN is applicable to any circumstances in which digital signature schemes are available. In particular, it fits a batch procession of a huge number of signatures.	
2.3 Basic theory and techniques	
(1) ESIGN was originally proposed in [1] in 1985. Since then, both problems, factoring $n = p^2q$ and approximate S -th root problem (AERP), have been extensively investigated by many excellent researchers such as Adleman, Bleichenbacher, Brickell, DeLaurentis, Girault, McCurley, Odlyzko, Peralta, Pollard, Shamir, Toffin, Vall{e}. The authors have also communicated with Lenstra and Buchmann on these problems. The fact that no efficient algorithms on both problems have been found since they were raised implies that these problems can be considered to be almost as intractable as factoring $n = pq$ and the RSA problem.	
(2) ESIGN can be proven secure in the random oracle model under the approximate S -th root assumption.	

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Reference:

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Previous use: None

